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Some Reflections on Nurkse’s “Patterns of Trade and Development” 
 
Alan V. Deardorff and Robert M. Stern 
University of Michigan 
 
I.   Introduction 
In his Introduction to Equilibrium and Growth in the World Economy:  Economic Essays 
by Ragnar Nurkse, Gottfried Haberler concluded (p. xii) that: 
 
“The Wicksell Lectures (April 7 and 10, 1959) were Ragnar Nurkse’s last words 
on trade and development.  He had evidently spent much care on their 
preparation.  But he was fully aware that he left many loose ends, and he was full 
of plans for further work.  He intended to write a comprehensive volume on trade 
and development and had started to draft parts.  His untimely death (in May 1959) 
at the age of fifty-two has deprived us of any further help from his fertile mind 
and wise counsel; it was a grievous loss for economic science as a whole, to say 
nothing of his many friends.  Let us hope, however, that the present collection 
will stimulate many others to follow the leads which he has given and to explore 
the lands which his researches have opened.”  
 
We will never know how Nurkse’s views of trade and development would have 
evolved, had he been able to observe the contrasting experiences of developing countries 
over subsequent years.  However, with the benefit of hindsight, we can ask how well the 
policies and the performances of developing countries corresponded to the expectations 
that Nurkse laid out in his essay. 
In this paper we will review the theory of trade and development that Nurkse 
suggested, interpreting it in the light of subsequent advances in the theories and empirics 
of trade and growth.  We will then examine the extent to which developing countries’ 
growth experiences during the second half of the 20
th century have matched Nurkse’s 
expectations, and also the extent to which his policy advice was followed and, where 
followed, successful.  Perhaps not surprisingly, given the limited information he had 
  1available when he wrote, the growth performance of countries following various 
development strategies has turned out to differ rather markedly from Nurkse’s 
expectations.  But his expectations for the policies that would be used, both by the 
majority of developing countries in the first decades after he wrote, and also by 
developed countries in response to those few who followed a more export oriented path, 
were remarkably prescient.  
 
II.   Contrasting Trends in World Trade from the Nineteenth Century to the Late 
1950s 
 
In his Wicksell Lectures, Nurkse reviewed at length “Contrasting Trends in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Century World Trade.”  He noted that, in the nineteenth 
century (1815-1914), trade was an engine of growth transmission as well as a means of 
improved allocation of existing resources.  This was a period in which Great Britain was 
the focal center of economic expansion that resulted in a very substantial increase in the 
demand for primary commodities from the so-called Regions of Recent Settlement (RRS) 
located in the temperate zones of North and South America, Australia, and New Zealand.  
Great Britain was also the source of the very large movements of financial capital that 
was instrumental especially in building the railway infrastructure in the RRS that 
facilitated the movement of their exports to Great Britain.  This period in time was truly 
the first great movement of globalization that served to integrate what are now many of 
the world’s high-income, industrialized countries. 
  From WWI to the end years of the 1950s, once the postwar recovery took hold, 
the production and trade of the major industrialized countries rose significantly.  But in 
contrast to the nineteenth century experience, Nurkse noted there was a marked 
  2slowdown in the rate of expansion in the primary exports, excluding oil, of the poorer 
countries.   He attributed this slowdown to a number of factors:  (1) the shift in the 
industrial countries from industries with a high raw material content to industries with a 
low material content; (2) the rising shares of services that did not depend on significant 
material inputs; (3) the low income elasticity of demand for many agricultural products; 
(4) increased agricultural protectionism; (5) substantial economies in industrial uses of 
natural materials; and (6) development of synthetic and other man-made substitutes for 
many staple commodities. 
  The question that Nurkse then raised was what are the less developed countries to 
do?  Given the pessimistic outlook for expanding production of agricultural products and 
other raw materials, the issue was whether and how industrialization could be pursued.  
The choices appeared to be production for export and production mainly for the domestic 
markets.  Nurkse was inclined to favor industrialization for export especially in 
developing countries that were relatively labor abundant.  But he expressed some concern 
about supply-side difficulties arising from the comparative lack of social and physical 
infrastructure in many poor countries, and, on the demand side, the possible protectionist 
reactions in the industrialized countries if their high-cost suppliers especially of labor-
intensive manufactures were to be injured and displaced by imports.  Nurkse considered 
at some length the difficulties that might arise in promoting industrialization to serve the 
home market.  The concerns here related to the interactions of agricultural and industrial 
development in relation to the patterns of expansion of domestic demand and the pitfalls 
of following policies of import substitution. 
 
  3From his vantage point in the late 1950s, Nurkse noted (p. 323):   
 
Manufacturing for export to more advanced countries…is being tried to some 
extent, in some places with success, and there are experts who predict great 
things for it in the near future.  But it can hardly be described as a major factor 
at present.  …More is happening along the lines of…the pattern of home-
market expansion.  …Industrialization for home markets is undoubtedly 
spreading. 
 
III.   Developments in World Trade and Growth from the Late 1950s to the 
Present 
 
In the preceding section, we have reviewed the essentials of Nurkse’s views and analysis 
of the factors that shaped the patterns of trade and development from the nineteenth 
century to the late 1950s.  We now consider the major developments in world trade since 
Nurkse presented his Wicksell Lectures in 1959.  It is obvious that Nurkse did not foresee 
the truly remarkable expansion of world production and trade that has occurred in the 
past half century and that has encompassed the major industrialized countries and many 
developing countries.   There has literally been a “second coming” of globalization that 
makes the nineteenth century look to be a pale comparison. 
To address the developments that Nurkse did not fully anticipate, we shall focus 
attention analytically on the determinants of trade and growth that may help to further the 
understanding of how the global trading system has been transformed. 
We will first review the policy choices that developing countries made in the 
1950s and 1960s, confirming the preponderance that he noted above of countries 
choosing “home-market expansion,” or what came to be called “import substitution,” as 
their strategy for economic growth.  At the same time, as he also noted, a handful of 
countries opted for “manufacture for export,” or “export promotion,” as their strategy. 
  4Nurkse anticipated correctly that the latter countries would face increasing 
barriers to their exports, especially in the labor-intensive textile and apparel sectors where 
their relative labor abundance gave them comparative advantage.  He did not anticipate, 
however, how well such countries would nonetheless succeed in growing, or that their 
success would gradually attract converts from the first group of countries.   
Nurkse fully understood that the home-market expansion strategy was only 
second best, and he suggested it only because of the barriers that he thought developed 
countries would place in the way of export expansion.  We will review the growth 
performance of countries that chose the different strategies.   
 
IV.   Theoretical Insights: Nurkse’s Model of Trade and Growth, in Retrospect 
 
In his Wicksell Lectures, Nurkse laid out three strategies for growth and trade.  In this he 
was primarily interested in the prospects for success of these three strategies and thus 
their policy implications, and he was therefore not explicit as to what economic model he 
had in mind.  In fact, it is not likely that he would have claimed to be working with an 
explicit model of the sort that was only then coming into fashion with the works of 
Samuelson and others.  Indeed, he was sufficiently attuned to the complexities of the 
economy that he might have renounced any such explicit model as being too simplistic.   
But he was definitely thinking within the general framework of the Heckscher-
Ohlin model of trade, and his reasoning reflected that.  Here we will ask what particular 
variant and extension of that model might have most closely corresponded with his 
thinking.  Then, in the context of that model, we will ask how his theoretical ideas about 
trade and growth look today, with fifty more years of experience in both economic theory 
and the experiences of developing countries. 
  5The Strategies 
Nurkse described three strategies of trade and growth, distinguished by the portions of the 
economy in which that growth was to be concentrated.  The first strategy – what we will 
here call Strategy I – is to grow by producing and exporting primary products.  This is the 
mechanism he described in his first lecture as having successfully achieved the growth of 
the RRS during the 19
th century.  At that time, countries such as the United States 
provided primary inputs to the rapidly expanding industrial complexes of Europe, 
especially the UK.   
The RRS themselves therefore remained relatively unindustrialized under 
Strategy I.  This worked well during the 19
th century, but for reasons we will mention 
below, was inadequate during the 20
th.  Therefore his other two strategies were directed 
toward industrialization. 
  Strategy II is also export based, but instead of exporting raw materials, this 
exploits another comparative advantage of many developing countries:  their relative 
abundance of unskilled labor.  Thus this strategy rests on the exports of labor intensive 
consumer goods, such as textiles and apparel. 
  Strategy III, introduced for reasons to be discussed in a moment, is not based on 
exports at all, but rather on producing for the domestic market of the developing country 
itself, or perhaps for itself and other developing countries in its region.  Because the 
domestic market for any good is rather small, and because without substantial exports 
demands for other consumer goods could not be satisfied through imports, Strategy III 
requires production not just in a few sectors, but in just about all, including both a broad 
range of consumer manufactures and also food.  Nurkse did allow this strategy to include 
  6imports of capital goods, which he regarded the developing countries as the least capable 
of producing themselves.  Thus there had to be a certain amount of exports of something, 
perhaps again primary products but in smaller volume than in Strategy I. 
  Nurkse saw substantial limitations to each of these strategies, and it was the 
limitations on Strategies I and II that led him to consider the third in spite of its obvious 
economic inefficiency.  The limitation on Strategy I, exporting primary products, was the 
now familiar expectation that world prices of primary products tend to fall over time.  
This evidently was either not true or not a problem during the 19
th century, but Nurkse 
was in good company during the 1950s in perceiving it to be a problem then, and in 
expecting the problem to continue.  Therefore he dismissed Strategy I as inadequate for 
the developing countries of his day. 
  The limitation that he saw for the Strategy II was not nearly as commonly 
perceived in the 1950s, and indeed one can marvel at his prescience.  This was that, as 
developing countries expand their exports of labor intensive goods, they would encounter 
increasing trade barriers for these products in their developed country markets.  He well 
understood that labor intensive sectors in the developed world would have to contract for 
this strategy to succeed, and that political forces in those countries would resist that 
contraction.  Thus the access into these markets by developing countries would be limited 
by tariffs or other trade barriers, as a direct result of any success that they began to 
achieve.  Thus, the strategy of growth through manufactured exports would be 
undermined. 
  It was the limitations on the first two strategies that led him to consider the third, 
for which he also saw limitations – several of them, in fact – but also at least one positive 
  7effect that bears mentioning.  The most obvious limitation, of course, is that countries 
would be denying themselves most of the benefits of pursuing their comparative 
advantage.  By allowing them, under this strategy, to continue importing capital goods, 
he did not deny them that benefit completely.  But by having them produce a full range of 
consumer manufactured goods, he more or less assured that consumers in developing 
countries, to the extent that their incomes rose enough to afford these goods, would be 
poorly served.  It seems clear that he was well aware of that, but as already noted he 
found the alternatives nonviable. 
  The more severe limitation of Strategy III, and one he stressed, was that it 
depended on countries being able to feed themselves.  Without exports to pay for 
imported food, countries would have no choice but to be essentially self sufficient, and 
yet it was not obvious to him that they could do it.  Resources would have to continue to 
be devoted to agriculture and to improving productivity there, or there would be no 
surplus labor available to produce other goods for the domestic market.  He saw this as 
the most binding constraint on economic development, given his pessimism about the 
other two strategies, and he seemed rather pessimistic about this as well. 
  He also discussed one other important limitation on this strategy of producing for 
the domestic market:  that the domestic market would be very small in many countries, 
often too small to support efficient production.  Thus he acknowledged the existence of 
scale economies in manufacturing production, and thus that producing for only a small 
domestic market would be very costly, with or without comparative advantage.  His 
solution to this, mentioned only in passing, was that developing countries should not 
eschew exports entirely, but that they should export to each other, and that they 
  8presumably should specialize within their developing-country regions to the extent 
needed to support minimally efficient plants. 
  This essentially completes the description of Strategy III, although it includes one 
additional implication, if successful, that bears mentioning.  To the extent that a 
developing country succeeds in growing its productive capacity in a broad range of 
manufactures, not just labor intensive ones, it will eventually be able to export some non-
labor-intensive goods to the rich world.  The advantage of this is that, by steering clear of 
the overstressed labor-intensive industries of the developed world, it will avoid the 
protectionist backlash that he forecast to be stimulated by labor-intensive exports.  
Instead, developing-country exports of more capital-intensive goods would feed into the 
nexus of trade within more advanced industries that already goes on among developed 
countries, and the new additions from the developed counties would be accepted without 
complaint. 
Nurkse’s Growth Model 
It may be noticed that these strategies do not really address how to make economic 
growth happen in the first place.  Rather, they simply assume such growth, and they are 
concerned instead with how to accommodate that growth within the world economy.  
Nurkse did not, at least in these Wicksell Lectures, pretend to have anything new to say 
about the causes of growth or how to achieve it. 
  Instead, he simply accepted that growth requires saving.  He did not discuss how 
this saving was to be achieved, although he seemed to see it as coming from within the 
developing economies rather than from abroad.  And he did not discuss the mechanisms 
  9by which savings is to be transformed into investment of one sort or another, and the 
associated difficulties with that transformation. 
  In particular, he did not really address how each of his three strategies for trade 
and growth might be implemented.  He simply spoke of countries as choosing one or 
another.  We can infer that his Strategy III would have to be implemented with trade 
barriers of some sort, to prevent imports of manufactured goods, but there is no 
implication here that such trade policies would themselves cause growth to occur.  His 
lectures were about accommodating a country’s growth within or outside of world 
markets, given that the growth occurs.  They were not about how to achieve growth. 
  His first lecture seems to be explaining the growth that occurred in the 19
th 
century as being a result of the exports of primary products, but it seems unlikely that 
Nurkse believed that such exports, in and of themselves, would have produced growth.  
Rather, when these exports took place in a growing world market, they added nicely to 
the incomes of the countries, and thus provided a source from which savings and 
investment could be extracted.  But presumably he would have agreed that additional 
ingredients are needed to prompt that savings, even out of a higher income, and that some 
countries undoubtedly participated in the 19
th century export boom without translating it 
into savings and growth.  Indeed, it is to some extent those countries who remained 
underdeveloped and were the subject of his strategies when he wrote. 
  As for implementing the strategies, aside from using trade barriers for Strategy 
III, it is not clear what Nurkse had in mind for directing an exporting economy into either 
raw materials or manufactures.  He tends to speak of these choices as though policy 
  10makers might control them directly, which of course may have been true in some 
developing countries of his day.   
Alternatively, one could argue that the world market would determine this 
specialization.  If a developing country does have an abundance of raw materials, then 
absent any policy to prevent it happening, exports of these will occur, with implications 
for income that depend on their price.  However, if prices decline as Nurkse expected, 
and if in addition the country’s labor force is expanding beyond the capacity of the 
resource sector to employ it, then again in the absence of policy to prevent it, labor-
intensive production and exports will occur.   
In other words, unless a country deliberately implements Strategy III by 
restricting trade, the choice between Strategies I and II will be made for it by world 
markets.  In each case, whether these will lead to growth will depend both on the returns 
that a country is able to derive from its specialization, which Nurkse discusses, and on 
whether it is able to turn income into savings and investment, which Nurkse leaves aside. 
Nurkse’s Trade Model 
In order to accommodate many of Nurkse’s ideas within an economic model, that model 
must include at a minimum more than one manufacturing sector as well as a primary 
product or agricultural sector.  These sectors must employ labor, of course, some sort of 
capital, and presumably land and/or natural resources for the primary product sector.  In 
addition, to capture the role of scale economies that play a small role in his discussion, it 
would be desirable to have increasing returns to scale in at least some manufacturing.  
Finally, the model may treat a small country for which prices in trade are given, except 
  11that it must also include the feedback from exports to rest-of-world protection that 
Nurkse expected in labor-intensive manufactures. 
  To capture these elements, the model would have to be a hybrid of other models, 
and one might fear that it would be too cumbersome to be of use.  That is not the case, 
however, as we will suggest. 
  Start with the model that Anne Krueger (1977) presented of trade and 
development in her Graham Lecture thirty years ago.  This was itself a hybrid of a 2-
factor (labor and capital), many-sector Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model combined with a 
three-factor (labor, capital, and land) specific-factors model.  Her model had a single 
agricultural sector employing labor and land, plus an arbitrary number of manufacturing 
sub-sectors employing labor and capital.  As discussed further in Deardorff (1984), labor 
in this model is distributed between agriculture and manufacturing largely based on the 
stocks of land and capital that are specific, respectively, to agriculture and to 
manufacturing as a whole.  Within manufacturing, however, because both labor and 
capital are mobile among the multiple sub-sectors, that part of the model behaves like the 
HO Model.   
Krueger assumed that all goods could be traded on the world market, from which 
a small developing country would take prices as given.  She also assumed that these 
prices within the manufacturing sector were such as to generate multiple cones of 
diversification.  The latter implies that, under free trade, a country will specialize in only 
a subset of the manufactured goods, those with labor intensities (relative to capital) 
corresponding to its aggregate employment of labor in the manufacturing sector relative 
to its capital stock. 
  12A main implication of the Krueger model is the way that patterns of specialization 
and trade depend on factor endowments.  A developing country with a great deal of land 
relative to both labor and capital will employ so much labor in the agricultural sector that 
not much labor will be available in manufacturing.  As a result, it will actually specialize 
in the more capital-intensive of the manufacturing sub-sectors, not because it has so much 
capital, but because it has so little labor to spare to work with that capital.  Thus within 
manufacturing it specializes in less labor-intensive goods.  But even there it produces 
little of them, and may not export them because these sectors are small.  The country 
exports agricultural products, perhaps exclusively.   
In contrast, if such a country had a much larger labor endowment, most of that 
labor would be employed in manufacturing.  Its capital-labor ratio within manufacturing  
would then be low, and it would specialize in, and export, labor-intensive goods.  Wages, 
incidentally, would be much lower than in the first case. 
The Krueger model provides an appropriate structure for much of Nurkse’s 
analysis, with only minor modifications.  We might think of splitting the agricultural 
sector into two, one producing primary products for export and the other producing food, 
either for export or for domestic consumption, but that will not much change the behavior 
of the model.  The manufacturing sector can be taken from Krueger’s model unchanged 
for most purposes, including the prediction that labor abundant developing countries, at 
least if their agricultural sectors are not large enough to employ too much of their labor, 
will under free trade specialize in and export very labor-intensive goods. 
In this form, the Krueger Model does a nice job of explaining the shift that will 
occur between Nurkse’s first two strategies.  A natural-resource abundant country with 
  13not too large a population will naturally export primary products in exchange for all else.  
But if the prices of primary products fall, and especially if the countries have much more 
labor than can be employed in the primary product sector, the free market will lead to 
specialization in labor-intensive goods. 
To turn the Krueger Model, thus conceived, into a Nurkse model, then, we need 
just two more elements.  The first is to depart from Heckscher-Ohlin in at least the more 
capital intensive manufacturing sub-sectors to include Krugman-style monopolistic 
competition.  This serves two purposes.  First, it adds increasing returns to scale, 
potentially accommodating Nurkse’s concern about domestic market size.  And second, 
by turning these manufactured goods into differentiated products, it allows for the intra-
industry trade and the less disruptive exports that Nurkse expected if a developing 
country were eventually able to export more capital intensive products. 
Adding Krugman monopolistic competition into the Krueger model is not as hard 
as it may sound.  That is exactly what Helpman and Krugman (1985) did with the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model, where they showed that essentially all standard properties of the 
HO Model survive unchanged when sectors of the HO model are instead made 
monopolistically competitive under their assumptions.  The only exception is that, instead 
of countries either exporting or importing in these sectors depending on supply relative to 
demand, they do both.  That is, domestic consumers buy products from both domestic 
and foreign firms, and domestic firms sell to both domestic and foreign consumers, 
regardless of whether domestic supply exceeds domestic demand or falls short of it.  The 
same will be true if some (or all) of the manufacturing sub-sectors of the Krueger Model 
are made monopolistically competitive in the same way. 
  14The other element to be added is political economy.  That is, to capture Nurkse’s 
idea that exports of labor-intensive goods will lead to a backlash of protection, we need to 
endogenize tariffs.  Fortunately, we only need to do this for the rest of the world, not for 
the developing country itself.  Although doing the latter might be worthwhile for its own 
sake, it is not necessary in order to reflect the ideas in Nurkse’s Lectures.  And since we 
are not otherwise modeling the rest of world, the addition to the Krueger model will 
simply be to assume that rest-of-world tariffs on imports of labor-intensive manufactures 
rise with the level of exports from the developing country.  This in turn means that the 
price the developing country will receive for its exports of these goods must fall as 
exports rise. 
This Nurkse Trade Model then generates Nurkse’s predictions, as follows.  First 
following Nurkse’s Strategy I, a natural-resource (i.e., land) abundant developing country 
will naturally export primary products.  As long as the prices of these products stay high, 
and the country’s population does not grow unwieldy, it will prosper.  But if, as Nurkse 
expects, the prices of these products decline over time, then the income from these 
exports will also decline and the return to any growth that the country manages to achieve 
will be disappointing. 
Strategy II is relevant for a country whose labor force is too large to employ 
mostly in primary products, either because of population growth or due to decline in the 
availability of natural resources.  And of course it may become the strategy of an open 
economy that was following Strategy I, if the price of primary products falls sufficiently.  
The Krueger Model un-amended would have predicted that the country will export the 
most labor intensive good, importing all other manufactures in exchange.  But the Nurkse 
  15model goes a step further in predicting an increase in foreign protection and a consequent 
fall in the price that the developing country can get for its exports.  Thus, while the 
mechanism is somewhat different, the result of a declining terms of trade is the same. 
Interpreting Strategy III within this Nurkse Model takes a bit more work.  In order 
to cause all manufactured goods to be produced in the country, tariffs or some other trade 
barrier will have to be put in place on all such goods that would otherwise be imported.  
In this model, as noted above, these imported goods may be of various capital intensities 
depending on the relative abundance in the country of land, labor, and capital.  A 
sufficiently land-abundant country, in spite of its scarcity of capital, may import some of 
the most labor intensive goods and need to protect them in order to follow Strategy III.  
Nurkse did not anticipate this, and indeed he would probably say that such a country will 
escape from the limitation of Strategy II and need not follow Strategy III.  Therefore a 
developing country that adopts Strategy III is likely to be one whose labor is sufficiently 
abundant relative to both land and capital that, under free trade, it would export only the 
most labor-intensive manufactured good and import all others. 
Strategy III would therefore require tariffs on all but the most labor-intensive 
manufactures, raising the domestic prices of these goods.  That price change will in turn 
cause the return to capital to rise and the real wage of labor to fall, as explained by the 
Stolper-Samuelson Theorem.  Since the country ceases to import most manufactures, 
prices will also adjust so that it exports less as well, its remaining exports being either the 
most labor-intensive manufactured goods in smaller quantity, or perhaps products of the 
primary-product sector. 
  16What now happens if the country succeeds in growing, in spite of the lower 
income that it now earns producing goods to which it is less well suited.  If it grows, its 
capital stock will rise relative to labor, and gradually, over time, its comparative 
advantage within manufacturing may move up the ladder of capital intensity.  This, it 
should be said, is not assured, even if it succeeds in increasing its overall capital-labor 
ratio, since similar growth is probably occurring abroad as well.  It must manage to grow 
faster than the rest of the world in order for its relative factor endowments to favor 
producing more capital intensive goods. 
If this happens, though, then the developing country will succeed not just in 
raising its income but in moving into the monopolistically competitive manufacturing 
sectors even for export.  At first it will not be a net exporter of these goods.  But because 
of product differentiation, it will export at least a small amount of the particular varieties 
of these goods that it produces, while still importing the more numerous varieties 
produced abroad.  Eventually though, if its growth is successful in this way, it could 
actually eliminate its tariffs on certain mid-level (in terms of capital intensity) 
manufactured goods and sustain net export positions in them.  This is the outcome that 
Nurkse described as being less likely to prompt a protectionist backlash in developed 
countries, since it would not be such a threat to their declining industries. 
Nurkse’s Track Record 
How accurate did Nurkse’s model of trade and growth turn out to be, as we look back 
now with fifty years of hindsight?  Some of his predictions have been borne out, but not 
all. 
  17  First, his prediction about a declining terms of trade in primary products has had a 
mixed record, and at the current moment looks particularly wide of the mark.  Prices of 
primary products have moved both down and up over the last fifty years, in rather large 
swings.  There certainly were times, especially in the first decade or two after he wrote, 
that primary product prices indeed fell.  But in the later period they rose, and today many 
primary product exporters are doing quite well, at least with that part of their economies.  
Not all, however, have so clearly benefited from exports of primary products, even when 
their prices rose.  Many such countries have failed to translate their incomes from exports 
into savings and investment, suggesting to some that there exists a “resource curse.”  
Even some oil exporters have failed to make good use of their oil windfall. 
  However, as this formalization of Nurkse’s model perhaps makes clearer than his 
own discussion, a country’s ability to sustain itself from primary product exports alone 
depends not just on their price but on the abundance of the natural resource itself (land, in 
the model) relative to labor.  As populations have grown, the shift to labor-intensive 
production has become more necessary.  Thus Strategy I has often been inadequate for 
success. 
  Nurkse foresaw quite correctly that Strategy II would lead to trade barriers being 
erected to limit the labor-intensive exports of developing countries.  This actually began 
with restrictions on exports of clothing from Japan, when it was in effect a developing 
country during its recovery from the devastation of World War II.  But these restrictions 
expanded, both in their coverage of textile and apparel products and in their coverage of 
developing country exporters, as various countries other than Japan attempted to pursue 
Strategy II.  The barriers ultimately took the form of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement 
  18(MFA), which was only terminated in 1995 with the creation of the World Trade 
Organization, which then phased out the barriers over the subsequent ten years. 
  What Nurkse did not foresee was that these barriers would not be large enough to 
prevent quite a number of countries from pursuing the strategy successfully, albeit less 
successfully than they might have in the absence of the MFA.  One reason for this may 
have been the fact that the barriers of the MFA took the form of quotas, as well as tariffs, 
and the rents from the quotas accrued to the exporting countries themselves.  Thus while 
they could not export as large a quantity as they might have if unrestricted, the price they 
got for their exports did not suffer.  Indeed, because these quotas were allocated country 
by country, some countries were able to earn more from exports of textiles and clothing 
than they would have without the MFA. 
  This advantage should not be overstated.  In addition to the MFA, tariffs on 
textiles and apparel remain some of the highest charged by developed countries.  And 
overall, as noted by Schavey (2001) of the U.S., tariffs on the exports of developing 
countries are quite a bit higher than the average tariff on all imports into developed 
countries.  The latter was reduced tremendously by the eight successful rounds of 
multilateral trade liberalization under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, but in 
part because developing countries were exempted from reducing their own tariffs during 
these negotiations, they got little in return.  And it is no doubt true that resistance to 
lowering tariffs on their exports was motivated in large part by the disruption to 
developed country industries that Nurkse predicted. 
  Nurkse therefore expected Strategy III to be, by default, the one chosen by most 
developing countries.  For several decades after he wrote this was the case, under the 
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able to feed themselves, since without exporting they could not count on substantial 
imports of agricultural goods.  Nurkse therefore saw the need for increased productivity 
in agriculture, although he did not see how this would occur.  In fact, agricultural 
productivity did increase substantially as a result of the Green Revolution, thus 
forestalling in many (but hardly all) countries the famines that would otherwise have 
accompanied their rapid population growth. 
  On the other hand, while many countries pursuing this strategy did manage to 
grow, they grew only slowly, which would be no surprise to Nurkse.  The surprise would 
have been that countries using Strategy II were able to grow so much more rapidly than 
the import-substitution countries, in spite of the protection they confronted in the 
developed world.  And it was this example, first by Japan and then by the Asian Tigers, 
that has gradually led more and more developing countries to shift from Strategy III to 
Strategy II. 
  Nurkse might note that the Asian Tigers were small economies, so that their 
exports never rose to the level that might have prompted a more extreme protectionist 
response.  Indeed, he might also observe that today, as ever more countries pursue 
Strategy II, including now the very large economies of China and India, the protectionist 
backlash may be growing.  This could account, for example, for the fact that the latest 
round of multilateral trade liberalization, the Doha Development Agenda, seems headed 
for failure. 
  On the other hand, we might also observe that the successful pursuit of Strategy II 
by an increasing number of countries has led over time to the near disappearance of many 
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of the most labor-intensive industries from the developed world, in spite of efforts to 
protect them.  As a result, the constituent interests for protecting these industries have 
themselves declined.  This is an outcome that Nurkse did not anticipate, but it is one that 
he would have well understood. 
V.   Conclusion 
 
Many things have happened over the last half century, both in the world trading system 
and in the economies of developing countries.  Some of these, Ragnar Nurkse anticipated.  
Others he did not.  But his framework for understanding the interactions between 
developing countries and world trade was an important tool for interpreting these events, 
and it continues to be so today. 
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